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THE CURRENT STATE OF EQUITY INVESTMENTS BY 
FOREIGN FUNDS [IN SOUTH KOREA] AND RELATED 
LEGAL ISSUES  
Written by Hee Chul Kang† 
Translated by Eugene Kim‡ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 15, 2004, the South Korean press gave extensive news 
coverage to a series of private individual “Question & Answer” session 
meetings which the Capital Group Companies Fund (“Capital Group”) held 
with many of the top chief executive officers (“CEOs”) of major Korean 
corporations.1  Known worldwide as a top U.S. private equity management 
company, the Capital Group is currently the largest institutional investor in 
South Korea.  As a major shareholder of large corporations such as Samsung 
Electronics, the Shin Han Financial Group, SK Group, and Hyundai Motors, 
the U.S. investment firm invited their CEOs to address questions and seek 
answers concerning the corporations’ overall performance and business 
trends.  The fact that the CEOs readily accepted the Capital Group’s 
invitation reveals just how great of an influence foreign investment funds 
exert on corporate management and governance of major corporations in 
South Korea. 
News of Sovereign Asset Management (“Sovereign”)’s clash with SK 
Corporation (“SK”) in early 2004 has also been well publicized, highlighting 
foreign funds’ willingness to participate in company management in South 
Korea.  After having acquired 14.99% of SK Corp. shares, the European 
private equity fund took a hostile turn against SK Corp.’s management and 
controlling shareholders.  At SK Corp.’s annual shareholders meeting held in 
March 2004, Sovereign submitted a shareholder proposal seeking to elect 
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the areas of corporate securities, M&A, banking, and finance, and is admitted to practice in South Korea 
and New York.  Mr. Kang’s article was originally published in Korean in KOREAN JOURNAL OF SECURITIES 
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1
 See, e.g., The U.S.’s Mighty Capital Group Visits . . . Initial Interviews with Korean CEOs, MAEIL 
ECONOMY NEWS, Sep. 15, 2004, at A24. 
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new candidates for the board of directors and to amend the company’s 
articles of incorporation, culminating in a bitter proxy contest between 
Sovereign and SK Corp.2 
Moreover, in recent years, large foreign funds investing in South 
Korea have either acquired or attempted to acquire management control 
rights of some of the country’s largest companies and financial institutions.  
Notable examples include Newbridge Capital, the Carlyle Group, and Lone 
Star, which purchased controlling stakes in Korea First Bank, KorAm Bank,3 
and Korea Exchange Bank, respectively. 
As a result of this wave of foreign acquisitions, there has been much 
public discussion about whether domestic private equity funds should be 
encouraged to compete more effectively with foreign funds operating on 
Korean soil.  In response, the South Korean government recently amended 
the Act on Business of Operating Indirect Investment and Assets (“Indirect 
Asset Management Act” or “IAMA”).4  The amended IAMA went into effect 
on December 6, 2004, and is poised to establish a new framework for the 
establishment and promotion of domestic private equity funds5 in South 
Korea.6 
It should come as no surprise that foreign funds have been able to 
establish a successful presence in the Korean market, wielding considerable 
influence over South Korea’s domestic industries and securities market.  The 
very existence of foreign funds and their overall activities in South Korea 
has become a major social and economic concern.  In particular, public 
attention has been increasingly focused on so-called foreign private equity 
funds and hedge funds.  
This Article explores the current state of investments by foreign funds 
in South Korea and examines related legal issues.  Part I briefly summarizes 
                                           
2
 Translator’s Note:  In July 2005, Sovereign Asset Management (“Sovereign”) sold its remaining 
shares in SK Corp., reaping a staggering profit of U.S. $900 million. 
3
 KorAm [Hanmi] Bank was later sold by the Carlyle Group to Citigroup Inc. in February 2004.  
4
 Translator’s Note:  The Act on Business of Operating Indirect Investment and Assets (“Indirect 
Asset Management Act” or “IAMA”), formerly referred to as the Indirect Investment Asset Management 
Business Act, was originally enacted on January 4, 2004.  The IAMA is an integration of two major laws 
previously known as the Securities Investment Trust Business Act and the Securities Investment Company 
Act. 
5
 In South Korea, the phrase “private equity fund” has been translated in various ways to refer 
alternatively to private securities funds, private securities investment funds, and private company 
acquisition funds.  The IAMA has also recently introduced a legal investment vehicle known as a 
“specialized private equity investment company” (“SPEIC”) which is virtually synonymous with “private 
equity fund.”  This Article uses the term “private equity fund” to refer to such entities for purposes of 
clarity and consistency.  Translator’s Note:  A more detailed discussion of private equity funds is given 
infra Part II. 
6
 The latest amendment to the IAMA was promulgated on October 5, 2004, through the passage of 
Act No. 7221, and became effective December 6, 2004. 
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the basic concepts and types of investment funds.  Part II examines the 
current status of securities investments made by foreign funds in South 
Korea.  Part III examines several key legal issues in connection with such 
investments.  
With respect to foreign investments in general, there are other major 
issues which this Article does not cover.  For example, discussions relating 
to domestic sales of beneficiary certificates of foreign funds (especially 
mutual funds) and domestic registration of foreign asset management 
companies are excluded.  Furthermore, while certain foreign funds (e.g., 
Lone Star Korea and Lend Lease Global Properties) continue to play an 
important role as major investors in the South Korean real estate and 
insolvent credit bond markets, this Article limits its discussion to securities 
investments made by foreign funds. 
II. THE CONCEPT OF A FUND AND CLASSIFICATION OF FOREIGN FUNDS  
A. The Fund Concept and Its Classification   
The general meaning of the term “fund” is “a pool of capital 
established for purposes of achieving particular objectives or conducting 
particular activities.”  The term is used in this Article to mean an 
“investment fund” in line with its traditional economic definition.  In other 
words, a fund can be defined as a pool of assets generated by multiple 
investors with shared interests.  It is a shared investment vehicle and, as if it 
were a living being, it is recognized as having the ability to bring together 
investments on behalf of its investors. 7   In theory, a fund is virtually 
synonymous with the so-called “collective investment scheme,” an indirect 
collective investment arrangement which pools capital investments from 
numerous investors.  A specialized professional oversees and manages the 
pooled investments and distributes income profits to the investors.  In South 
Korea, both the fund concept and the IAMA’s definition of an indirect 
investment scheme share almost the same meaning.  
Funds are generally classified as either agreement-type investment 
trusts or entity-type investment companies based on their legal structure.  
They can be further categorized as:  (1) either open-end investments or 
closed-end investments depending on investment pooling methods and 
limitations; (2) either unit-type investments or open-type investments based 
on the fluctuating or fixed nature of the principal investment; (3) bond-type, 
stock-type, or mixed-type funds depending on the tax treatment of investors; 
                                           
7
 Sam Chul Park, Commentary on Investment Vehicles 40 (Sam Woo Sa 2001). 
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and (4) either public funds or private funds based on methods used in 
attracting investors to the fund.8   
Article 27 of the IAMA classifies indirect investment vehicles (i.e., 
funds) based on the type of capital investment.  They can fall under any of 
the following:  (1) securities indirect investment funds; (2) derivative 
indirect investment funds; (3) real estate indirect investment funds; 
(4) actual indirect investment funds; (5) short-term financial indirect 
investment funds; (6) re-indirect investment funds; or (7) special assets 
indirect investment funds.  Because of the special nature of direct investment 
vehicles, Chapter 5 of the IAMA also provides for:  (1) exchange traded 
indirect investment funds; (2) class-type indirect investment funds; 
(3) transfer-type indirect investment funds; (4) mother-child-type indirect 
investment funds; (5) securities investment companies for purposes of 
corporate restructuring; and (6) securities investment companies for 
purposes of company acquisition/takeover. 
B. General Classification of Foreign Funds 
Rather than relying on legal classifications, foreign funds investing in 
Korean companies can generally be divided into three main categories: 
private equity funds, hedge funds, and mutual funds.9  In this Section, this 
Article briefly examines the concept behind each of the three fund 
categories.10  
                                           
8
 Private equity funds are distinguishable from public offerings, which must comply with various 
strict regulations set forth in the Korean Securities and Exchange Act.  Public offerings raise funds from 
numerous unspecified investors in the form of sale of securities of listed companies to the general public.  
By contrast, private equity funds acquire funds from qualified institutional investors or a small number of 
unspecified accredited investors.  Such investors are generally sophisticated, financially savvy individuals 
or entities that have a special association with, or intimate knowledge of, the securities offered by private 
equity funds.  Whereas the need to protect investors is obvious in public offerings of securities, it is much 
less evident in the case of private equity funds.  In fact, government regulation in the private equity fund 
industry is very low or virtually nonexistent. 
9
 One representative type of fund frequently discussed is a public pension fund in which 
government entities operate as investors.  Examples include the Hermes Group pension funds of the United 
Kingdom and the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS).  Another representative 
type is the so-called corporate governance improvement fund.  The main purpose of such funds is to 
improve or reform the corporate governance standards of the companies in which they invest in order to 
increase the overall valuation of these companies.  Notable examples of corporate governance improvement 
funds include the Oppenheimer Funds and CalPERS (as well as Sovereign, which claims to be an 
institutional fund aimed at improving corporate governance). 
10
 The discussion in Part II has been prepared in reliance of the foregoing materials.  See generally 
Hyung Tae Kim, Promoting and Improving the Infrastructure Private Equity Funds: The Importance of 
Buyout Funds (Korean Securities Research Center 2004) (unpublished seminar materials); Hee Jin Noh, 
Regulation and Characteristics of Hedge Funds (Korean Securities Research Center 1998); The Korean 
Association of Investment Vehicles, Hedge Funds (2002); Erik J. Greupner, Comment, Hedge Funds are 
Headed Down-Market: A Call for Increased Regulation?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1555 (2003); Michael 
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1. Private Equity Funds 
“Private equity fund” is not a legal term.  It generally refers to a pool 
of private investments raised by investment experts from a relatively small 
number of investors (e.g., institutional investors or investment-savvy 
individuals). 11   Such investments are considered mid- or long-term 
investments in the form of equity securities that are not generally tradable in 
the public marketplace.  A private equity fund typically takes the form of a 
limited partnership in which a fund manager makes a substantial investment 
and becomes a general partner with unlimited liability.  On the other hand, 
investors in the fund become limited partners with limited liability.12  In the 
United States, private equity funds are not subject to regulation under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940.  Furthermore, virtually no U.S. law exists 
to protect investors participating in such funds.  Many foreign funds that 
have recently become well known in South Korea for their active 
investments on Korean soil—such as the Carlyle Group, Lend Lease, and 
Newbridge Capital —are private equity funds. 
Private equity funds are similar to hedge funds (as discussed below) in 
that no legal regulations exist with respect to investor protection.  Significant 
differences exist, however, between the two in terms of their investment 
objectives, methods and strategies, investment period, and types of investors.  
For example, private equity funds invest mainly in securities or other related 
equities of privately-held corporations (or in the case of public companies, 
liquid securities with voting management rights), while hedge funds invest 
in various financial market instruments including bonds, financial 
derivatives, or currencies in addition to corporate securities.  Furthermore, 
private equity funds in most cases participate in the management affairs of 
their invested companies, whereas hedge funds do not.  In addition, private 
equity funds aim to reap mid- or long-term investment profits, while hedge 
funds focus on short-term profits. 
                                                                                                                              
Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 
UNIV. PENN. L. REV. 755 (2003); Joseph W. Barlett & Eric Swan, Private Equity Funds: What Counts and 
What Doesn’t, 26 J. CORP. L. 393 (2001); DANIEL A. STRACHMAN, HEDGE FUNDS (2002); Dion Friedland, 
Magnum Funds, The Hedge Fund Ass’n, About Hedge Funds, 2001, http://www.thehfa.org//aboutus.cfm. 
11
 The Investment Company Act of 1940 of the United States classifies investment funds into two 
basic categories:  (1) private funds, which gather investors by private and confidential means, place no 
restrictions on investor eligibility criteria, and involve fewer than 100 investors; and (2) qualified purchaser 
funds, which gather investors by private and confidential means, but place limitations on investors by 
classifying them as either private investors, who invest more than U.S. $5 million, or general corporations, 
which invest more than U.S. $25 million. 
12
 While it is legally possible to organize an investment vehicle in the form of a limited liability 
companies (“LLC”), most vehicles are structured in the form of a limited partnership (“LP”) due to tax 
concerns and investor liability issues. 
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Private equity funds in South Korea have frequently been associated 
with buyout funds.  Buyout funds usually seek to acquire management rights 
of companies with undervalued assets to increase overall valuation of such 
companies through corporate restructuring.  When higher valuation is 
achieved, the funds sell their securities to other strategic investors to recoup 
their investment and reap profits.  Buyout funds, however, are just one 
representative type of private equity funds.  Other types of private equity 
funds exist as well.  For example, venture capital funds are funds which 
primarily invest in early-stage or startup companies.  Mezzanine funds invest 
mainly in convertible bonds and bonds with stock warrants.  In 2003 alone, 
approximately U.S. $1.9 billion was invested in the Asian region through 
various forms of private equity funds. 
2. Hedge Funds 
Hedge funds are funds in which investment experts raise private 
equity assets from a small number of investors.  They employ various 
speculative and leveraged techniques and use financial derivative 
instruments to maximize short-term profits in accordance with certain 
overall investment strategies.  These funds are usually created in tax-haven 
jurisdictions.  The Quantum Fund run by George Soros is one example of a 
hedge fund.  Similar to private equity funds, these funds are exempt from 
regulation under the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940.13  
The advantages associated with hedge fund investments include 
absolute profits and efficient portfolio composition.  The disadvantages, on 
the other hand, are low levels of transparency, high risk (i.e., speculation), 
high fees, and limited liquidity.  Similar to private equity funds, hedge funds 
invest in shares of non-listed corporations.  As of 2004, there were 
approximately 8,350 hedge funds operating worldwide, with a global gross 
working capital totaling U.S. $875 billion.  
In the United States, both investment banks and traditional banks have 
recently substantially increased their investments in hedge funds.  The Asian 
Wall Street Journal reported in October 2004 that Lehman Brothers was 
negotiating the acquisition of GLG Partners, a large U.K. hedge fund, and 
that JP Chase & Co. had acquired more than half the shares of Highbridge 
Capital Management, a New York hedge fund with U.S. $7 billion in assets.  
In addition, according to a recent report by Citicorp, the total amount of 
investment assets held by hedge funds amounted to U.S. $500 billion in 
                                           
13
 Recent discussion in the U.S. has centered on the issue of desirability of federal regulation of 
hedge funds by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.  See generally Greupner, supra note 10. 
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2000, with 20% owned by institutional investors such as pension funds.  It is 
expected that hedge fund assets will rise to several trillion dollars by 2010, 
with 80% of assets held by institutional investors.14 
3. Mutual Funds  
Mutual funds are associated with the concept of open-end/public-
offering indirect investment companies under the IAMA. 15   They are 
distinguishable from private equity funds or hedge funds in that mutual 
funds raise funds publicly from investors.  Mutual funds usually invest in 
securities or bonds with high liquidity, such as shares of publicly-held 
corporations.  To protect the public investor, mutual funds in the United 
States are subject to stringent regulations including federal securities laws 
and the Investment Company Act of 1940.  For instance, all mutual funds 
must register with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.  Complete 
disclosure to the public must also be made with respect to their operation, 
fees, costs, and benefits.  In the United States, where the mutual fund 
industry is most developed, there were 8,126 mutual funds in operation in 
2003, with a total net asset value of U.S. $741.5 billion.  
4. Comparison by Type of Fund 
The three types of funds are compared and summarized in Table I.  
 
Table I 
Comparison by Fund Type 
 
PRIVATE EQUITY 
FUND HEDGE FUND MUTUAL FUND 
ENROLLMENT OF INVESTORS  Private Private  Public 
PROTECTION OF INVESTORS Relaxed Relaxed Stringent  
CONTRIBUTION BY FUND 
MANAGER 
Permitted  Permitted  Not Permitted  
INVESTMENT TYPE  Equity Securities  Various Instruments  Various Instruments 
INVESTMENT TIMEFRAME Mid- or Long-Term Short-Term Mid- or Long-Term 
REGULATION Absence of 
Regulation 
Absence of 
Regulation 
Regulation  
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE TO 
THE PUBLIC 
No Disclosure  No Disclosure  Disclosure 
FUND MANAGER TYPE Any Person Expert/Professional  Expert/Professional 
FUND MANAGER COMPENSATION Incentives Incentives Management Fees 
                                           
14
 ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL, [No title given by author], Oct. 1, 2004, at M6. 
15
 In comparison to investment trusts and companies operating on South Korea soil, far more 
numerous, complex contract-type and company-type fund structures are used in the United Kingdom and 
the United States, respectively. 
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III. CURRENT STATE OF INVESTMENTS BY FOREIGN FUNDS [IN SOUTH 
KOREA] 
According to the Korea Stock Exchange, the total value of listed 
securities investments made by foreigners is approximately U.S. $147 
trillion as of August 6, 2004.  This amount represents 43.6% of the total 
aggregate market capital of the Korean securities market.16   
According to Table II,17 the amount of investment made by investment 
companies represents approximately 44.0% of the total amount of foreign 
securities investments.  It is safe to say that investment companies fall into 
the category of funds.  Because pension funds qualify as funds, and 
securities holdings by securities houses are likely held in the form of funds, 
one can then conclude that about 50 to 55% of total foreign investments are 
made by means of investing through funds. 
 
Table II 
Securities Investments by Non-Koreans in South Korea 
INVESTMENTS 
MADE BY 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 REPRESENTATION 
BY PERCENTAGE 
 
INDIVIDUALS 
 
1,995 3,151 3,869 4,535 4,794 5,024 5,243 34.2% 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
4,519 5,329 6,085 7,213 8,066 9,104 10,092 65.8% 
—INVESTMENT 
 FUNDS  
3,198 3,763 4,239 4,966 5,503 6,190 6,751 44.0% 
—PENSION 
 FUNDS  
476 522 598 686 766 874 991 6.5% 
—SECURITIES 
 FIRMS   
250 285 310 336 369 388 421 2.7% 
—BANKS 
 
243 282 322 357 361 387 412 2.7% 
—INSURANCE 
 COMPANIES 
144 159 180 207 228 250 268 1.7% 
—OTHERS  
 
208 318 436 661 839 1,015 1,249 8.1% 
 
Based on data gathered from the Korea Securities Exchange, Table III 
shows the number of investments in listed Korean companies (two or 
greater) made by each non-Korean entity holding more than five percent of 
                                           
16
 The Korea Securities Exchange, Foreign Ownership Figures and Trends in the Aftermath of 
KOSPI Peak, Aug. 10, 2004, available at http://www.krx.co.kr/webeng/index.jsp. 
17
 See The Korea Securities Exchange, Share Ownership (of Five Percent or Greater) by Foreigners, 
Apr. 27, 2004, available at http://www.krx.co.kr/webeng/index.jsp. 
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shares, as of April 24, 2004. 18   The author’s independent review of 
substantial shareholding (change) reports reveals that the share ownership 
figures have been reported in most cases by either an asset management firm 
or investment trust consulting firm that manages funds.  It seems therefore 
that funds are the actual share owners.  In particular, it appears that most of 
them are firms managing public mutual funds.  Table III, however, only 
shows information analyzed based on number of investments made by 
foreign funds.  Although private equity funds make fewer investments 
relative to other types of funds, their share investments in companies are 
often large enough to give them management rights.  It is therefore difficult 
to simply conclude that private equity funds’ investments in South Korea 
constitute only a small portion of total foreign fund investments as a whole.  
 
Table III 
Number of Investments by Foreign Funds in South Korea 
(as of April 24, 2004) 
NAME OF FOREIGN FUND NUMBER OF INVESTMENTS MADE 
Capital Research Management Companies 15 
Capital Group II 13 
JF Asset Management Limited  12 
Templeton Asset Management  11 
Morgan Stanley DW Inc. 9 
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft 8 
Arnold & S Blake Advisors LLC 5 
Fidelity Fund  5 
Neuberger & B LLC 5 
The Korea Fund  5 
ARIS AIG 4 
Hermes Pension Mgt. Ltd.  4 
SIMIL 4 
Mitsubishi Corp.  3 
The Bow Post Group, LLC 2 
Deutsche Bank London  2 
Sumitomo Corp.  2 
Wellington Management Company LLP 2 
Deutsche Investment Management Americas, Inc.  2 
Genesis Asset Managers  2 
Goldman Sachs International  2 
IFC  2 
Joho Fund Ltd.  2 
OCM Emerging Markets FL  2 
Platinum Asset Management Trusts 2 
TOTAL NUMBER OF INVESTMENTS BY FOREIGN FUNDS 125 
                                           
18
 Data was obtained from both the Korea Securities Exchange and the Korean Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotation System (“KOSDAQ”). 
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Table IV shows a specific breakdown of share ownership in listed 
Korean companies by each of several foreign investors (i.e., an investment 
management company or a trust investment consulting firm that manages 
funds) holding more than five percent of shares.  
Statistical information shows that from 2001 onward, many foreign 
funds (such as Capital Group International, Inc., Capital Research and 
Management Company,19 JF Asset Management Limited,20 Templeton Asset 
Management Limited, 21  and Morgan Stanley DW Inc. 22 ) have steadily 
increased their investments in many Korean companies.  As of June 24, 
2004,23 CGII holds a total average of U.S. $2.427 billion in 13 investments 
while CRMC holds U.S. $2.286 billion in 17 investments.  Both CGII and 
CRMC are the two largest foreign fund investors in South Korea in terms of 
investment amount.  Ranked third is Momenta (Cayman) Ltd.,24 an indirect 
investment company located in the Cayman Islands that holds 5,117,550 
shares of SK Telecom, valued at U.S. $972 million.  It is also the largest 
single investment made in terms of investment amount. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
19
 The Capital Group Companies, Inc. is an investment consulting firm with 100% ownership of 
Capital Group International, Inc. (CGII) and Capital Research and Management Company (CRMC).  
Neither CGII nor CRMC own securities of their invested companies, but rather manage their investments 
on behalf of mutual funds that actually invest in such companies. 
20
 J.P. Morgan Fleming Asset Management (Asia) Inc. is an investment management company 
which fully owns JF Asset Management Limited.  The latter also manages investment funds administered 
by JPMorgan Chase. 
21
 This firm manages mutual funds administered by Franklin Templeton Investments. 
22
 Morgan Stanley DW Inc., an affiliate company of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, manages various 
mutual funds and trusts. 
23
 The Korea Securities Exchange, Reporting of Five Percent or Greater Share Ownership by 
Foreigners, Jun. 24, 2004, available at http://www.krx.co.kr/webeng/index.jsp. 
24
 According to the substantial share ownership report filed by Momenta (Cayman) with the Korean 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the investment firm holds American Depository Receipts (“ADRs”) 
of SK Telecom Co., Ltd.  (“SK Telecom”) for purposes of purchasing bonds that have been issued as part 
of SK Telecom’s exchangeable bonds issuance program.  SK Telecom’s shares are purchased as original 
shares, and the exchangeable bonds are issued based on the purchase of original shares.  In this regard, they 
should be distinguished from ordinary investment funds. 
FEBRUARY 2006 THE CURRENT STATE OF EQUITY INVESTMENTS 83 
Table IV 
Securities Investments (5% or Greater) by Foreign Funds in Korean 
Companies (as of April 24, 2004) 
NAME OF FOREIGN 
FUND  
NAME OF INVESTED 
COMPANY  
NUMBER OF 
SHARES 
OWNED 
TOTAL  
NUMBER OF 
OUTSTANDING 
SHARES 
OWNERSHIP 
PERCENTAGE 
Keum Kang Koryo 
Chemicals  
555,500 10,520,000 5.28% 
Dae-Gu Bank  6,636,650 132,125,000 5.02% 
Dae-lim Commercial, 
Inc.  
3,327,740 35,800,000 9.30% 
Pusan Bank  15,147,500 146,683,650 10.33% 
Bing G-rae  541,380 9,951,241 5.44% 
Samsung Electronic Co.  6,066,870 74,693,696 8.12% 
Shinhan Financial 
Investment Co.  
26,487,620 294,401,300 9.00% 
KET  14,372,430 284,849,400 5.05% 
Korea Electric  407,040 8,073,375 5.04% 
Han-il Cement  611,030 6,883,087 8.88% 
Hyundai Commercial 
Development  
5,449,960 75,384,180 7.23% 
Hyosung  2,495,000 32,818,752 7.60% 
KEC  583,710 8,054,797 7.25% 
LG Construction Co.  3,676,400 51,000,000 7.21% 
CAPITAL RESEARCH 
AND MANAGEMENT 
COMPANIES 
(CRMC)  
LG Fire Insurance Co.  3,218,610 60,000,000 5.36% 
 Total: 15 89,577,440   
Kookmin Bank 20,154,700 336,379,116 5.99% 
Samsung Fire Insurance 
Co.  
4,685,758 48,874,837 9.59% 
Shinhan Financial Co.  24,370,204 294,401,300 8.28% 
Cheil  391,670 4,601,649 8.51% 
Pulmu Wom  316,470 5,159,568 6.13% 
Korea Gas Construction   3,955,520 77,284,510 5.12% 
Korea Tire  9,338,240 150,189,929 6.22% 
Hyundai Commercial 
Development 
8,325,868 75,384,180 11.04% 
Hyundai Motors Co.  12,282,139 219,518,502 5.60% 
Hyundai Fire Insurance 
Co.  
681,210 8,940,000 7.62% 
INI Steel  6,009,170 98,897,919 6.08% 
LG Construction  4,417,670 51,000,000 8.66% 
CAPITAL GROUP 
INTERNATIONAL, 
INC. (CGII) 
LG Cable  1,640,040 32,200,000 5.09% 
 Total: 13 96,568,659   
 
[Table IV continues on next page] 
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Table IV (continued) 
Gwang Ju Shin Segae 
Dept. Store  
80,370 1,600,000 5.02% 
Keum Kang Koryo 
Chemicals  
638,652 10,520,000 6.07% 
Dae Shin Securities  3,643,500 48,586,400 7.50% 
Samsung Tech One  5,168,800 77,000,000 6.71% 
Sam Yang Gennex  190,950 2,985,917 6.40% 
Sam Hwa Crown 226,070 3,736,455 6.05% 
Sung Shin Co.  1,564,990 19,142,775 8.18% 
Shin Do Ri Co.  507,690 10,080,029 5.04% 
NC Soft  1,149,597 18,908,454 6.08% 
Korea Export 
Packaging Co.  
260,040 4,000,000 6.50% 
LC Cable  1,777,990 32,200,000 5.52% 
JF ASSET 
MANAGEMENT 
LIMITED  
STX  1,628,779 21,239,063 7.67% 
 Total: 12   16,837,428   
Dong-Ah Chemicals  813,410 9,514,000 8.55% 
Samsung Micro 
Chemicals   
4,684,460 25,800,000 18.16% 
Samsung Mid  23,163,673 230,865,031 10.03% 
Young Won Export   6,403,150 51,014,336 12.55% 
Woong-Jin Co Way  1,859,430 23,959,690 7.76% 
Poong San  2,785,630 32,000,000 8.65% 
Hite Beer  962,190 19,197,208 5.01% 
Hyundai Commercial 
Dev. Co.  
14,770,370 75,384,180 19.59% 
Cheil Jedang (CJ) 1,844,570 23,972,727 7.69% 
LG Health Co.  1,648,230 15,618,197 10.55% 
TEMPLETON ASSET 
MANAGEMENT  
SK Corp.  6,394,390 126,977,822 5.04% 
 Total: 11 62,329,503   
 
 
Tables V and VI show a list of representative transactions in which 
foreign funds made investments in listed Korean financial institutions and 
Korean companies, respectively, with an intent to either acquire management 
rights or participate in management affairs.25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
25
  Tables V and VI have been selectively prepared using data compiled by Hyung Tae Kim.  See 
supra note 10. 
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Table V 
Acquisitions by Foreign Funds of Korean Financial Institutions 
ACQUIRED 
FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTION 
FOREIGN FUND INVESTMENT DATE 
INVESTMENT 
AMOUNT  
(U.S. MILLIONS) 
INVESTMENT 
PURPOSE 
Good Morning 
Securities 
H&Q, Lombard May 1998 $82 Acquisition 
(48%) 
Korea Exchange 
Bank 
Lone Star August 2003 $1,060 Acquisition 
(55%) 
Hamni Bank Carlyle Group September 1998 $385 Acquisition 
(40%) 
Korea First Bank Newbridge Capital December 1998  $427 Acquisition 
(50%) 
Kookmin Bank Goldman Sachs May 1999 $500 Share Purchase 
(11%) 
Korea Exchange Card Olympus Capital December 1999 $118 Acquisition 
(54%) 
Hana Bank Allianz AG April 2000 $150 Share Purchase 
(12%) 
LG Card Warburg Pincus October 2000 $370 Share Purchase 
(19%) 
 
 
 
 
Table VI 
Acquisitions by Foreign Funds of Korean Companies 
ACQUIRED 
COMPANY    FOREIGN FUND 
INVESTMENT 
DATE 
INVESTMENT 
AMOUNT  
(U.S. MILLIONS) 
INVESTMENT 
PURPOSE 
Winnia Mando 
 
UBS Capital 
Consortium 
November 1999 $201 Asset Purchase 
Mando Inc.  
 
JP Morgan 
Partners Consortium 
January 2000 $470 Asset Purchase 
Hae Tae  
 
UBS Capital 
Consortium  
July 2001 $410 Asset Purchase 
Hanaro 
Communications  
Newbridge-AIG  October 2003 $1,100 Stock Transfer 
 
In the above transactions, all of the investments which led to 
acquisition of management rights were made by private equity funds.  
Unlike public mutual funds, private equity funds have invested enough to 
acquire management rights or at least participate in management.  As 
illustrated above, foreign private equity funds have invested in Korean 
financial institutions for the specific purpose of acquiring management 
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rights.26  It is this fact which may have sparked such intense discussion 
about encouraging the creation of domestic private equity funds in South 
Korea. 
In many cases, foreign funds have become increasingly proactive 
shareholders.  Not only have they exercised their shareholder rights at the 
annual shareholders meeting, but they have also demanded that the 
controlling shareholders and management improve corporate governance, 
enhance management transparency, and give priority to shareholders’ 
interests.  
For example, the Capital Group demanded that Samsung Electronics 
appoint outside directors in 2000 and 2001 and move its principal place of 
business to New York in 2003.  Moreover, in 2004 the fund requested that 
Samsung’s CEO and CFO participate in one of their board of directors 
meetings.27  Although such exhibits of shareholder activism by foreign funds 
may be perceived as management interference, one cannot deny the fact that 
foreign funds have contributed significantly to the overall improvement of 
corporate governance and management transparency of major Korean 
companies.  Accordingly, one would expect that foreign funds will make use 
of their shareholders rights in an active and decisive manner, either in their 
individual capacity or in cooperation with other foreign investors. 
Until now, foreign funds that have sought to acquire management 
rights of Korean companies have done so through friendly purchases of 
shares from other majority shareholders, by means of open competition or 
negotiation.  However, recently there has been much discussion about the 
possibility of hostile takeovers in South Korea by foreign investors.  In 
reality, hostile takeovers in the form of foreign fund investments remain a 
rare phenomenon to this day.  One notable exception has been Sovereign’s 
acquisition of SK Corp. shares in early 2004.  Hostile takeovers initiated by 
foreigners are unlikely to become more common because they are not 
encouraged by the current Korean business climate.  Furthermore, labor 
unions and company employees tend to show considerable opposition to the 
prospect of job loss resulting from corporate restructuring.  However, as 
illustrated by Kumkang Korea Chemical’s recent hostile takeover attempt of 
Hyundai Elevator Inc., if domestic firms are likely to increasingly engage in 
                                           
26
 Although the Carlyle Group did not achieve the status of first-priority negotiators, they not only 
actively participated in the bidding process for the contemplated sale of Daehan Investment & Securities, 
Ltd. and the Korea Investment Securities Co., Ltd., but they were also heavily involved in the actual sale of 
Daewoo Heavy Industries & Machinery Ltd. 
27
 Foreign Assault – Preparing for the Worst Case Scenario: Emergency M&A Agenda for Samsung 
Electronics, KOREA ECONOMY NEWS, Oct. 6, 2004, at P1.    
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hostile takeover attempts in the near future, one cannot disregard the 
possibility of such attempts by foreign funds, especially private equity funds.  
IV. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM INVESTMENTS BY FOREIGN FUNDS 
The following is a list of general problems with respect to investments 
by foreign funds in domestic Korean companies:28  
 
1. The possibility of acquiring management rights; 
2. Issues relating to large dividend payouts to securities held by 
foreigners; 
3. The reduction in floating stocks; 
4. The possibility of withdrawal of foreign capital from the 
Korean securities market; and  
5. The risk of harm to the Korean financial system resulting 
from use of financial derivatives. 
 
It is safe to say that these matters can typically arise in the case of 
investments by foreign funds.  Nevertheless, they become much more severe 
when investments are made by so-called financial investors, relative to 
investments made by industrial investors. 
Because this Article focuses on exploring legal issues, it stops short of 
examining the above matters in detail.  The purpose of this Part is to merely 
illustrate a set of more general problems associated with investments by 
foreign funds in South Korea. 
V. RELATED LEGAL ISSUES  
This Part reviews several key legal issues concerned with domestic 
investments by foreign funds.  In the aftermath of the heated dispute over 
management control rights of SK Corp. between Sovereign and controlling 
shareholders, many discussions 29  have focused on the belief that South 
Korea lacks appropriate legal defensive measures against potential hostile 
                                           
28
 For a further discussion of problematic issues, see Je-Chul Kim et al., Discussion of Problematic 
Issues in Connection with Comparative Share Ownership by Foreigners, Korean Securities Research 
Center (Jun. 2004).  See also Hyun Soo Park, Acquisition Strategies and Takeover Defenses of [Korean] 
Companies by Foreign Investors, 50 SANG-JANG HYUP 83 (2004).  
29
 In this regard, overseas anti-takeover measures, such as the so-called “poison pill” and the voting 
rights system (golden shares versus ordinary shares) have been discussed as alternative defensive strategies.  
Most measures, however, have not been tested as valid under existing Korean law.  Introducing them as 
part of legislation in South Korea would require overcoming numerous obstacles.  
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takeovers or undue management interference by foreign companies, 
including foreign funds. 
However, foreign funds’ efforts to participate in management are, by 
and large, carried out within legally permissible procedures and methods in 
accordance with relevant domestic laws, such as the Securities Exchange Act 
or the Commercial Code.  In many cases, they make legitimate claims for 
corporate action (e.g., initiating corporate governance reform measures) by 
actively exercising their shareholder rights. 
Moreover, the issue of whether a hostile M&A should be accepted or 
tolerated is a matter of national government policy.  In many circumstances, 
it becomes irrelevant to consider the nationality of entities or persons 
initiating hostile takeovers. 
Accordingly, instead of discussing legal issues in a general sense, this 
Article attempts to examine several significant issues 30  that have been 
uncovered by one attorney in the course of his own legal practice.  The 
Article also suggests the author’s opinions on ways to resolve such matters.  
Much of the following discussion is applicable not only to foreign funds but 
also to investments made by foreign individuals.  
A. The Problem of Reverse Discrimination Faced by Domestic Investors     
As revealed in the management rights dispute between Sovereign and 
incumbent management, as well as in the context of promoting domestic 
private equity funds [in South Korea], one problematic issue has been that 
domestic investors face systematic reverse discrimination when compared to 
foreign investors and their funds.  
1. The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act  
Under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (“MRFTA”), 
domestic companies (especially large conglomerates) are subject to an array 
of stringent regulations.  For example, when conglomerates establish holding 
companies or conduct activities related to holding companies, they must 
abide by certain limitations set forth in the MRFTA.  In addition, the 
MRFTA places restrictions on the conglomerates’ gross investment amount 
                                           
30
 There are important tax issues to consider, such as corporate taxation on dividend income for 
funds and marginal profits in share transfers, and taxation on securities exchanges.  This Article does not 
deal with such issues, however.  Further, Citigroup Inc. acquired management rights of KorAm Bank from 
the Carlyle group in February 2004, and it attempted to delist the Korean bank from the Korea Securities 
Exchange.  Since large amounts of dividends and capital decreases are involved, it is difficult to regard 
them as merely fund-related matters.  This Article does not take into account such matters since relevant 
activities are pursued through regulation and other legal procedures.   
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and guarantee of debts for their related subsidiaries.  Foreign investors, in 
contrast, are not subject to such restrictions or limitations.  In the case of 
foreign funds, it is plausible that the funds may be classified as holding 
companies since their main purpose is investment in other companies.  The 
MRTFA, however, does not currently regulate holding companies 
incorporated overseas.  
Under the MFRTA’s extraterritoriality theory, the Korean statute may 
reach and govern business combinations that produce a large effect on the 
domestic market even though they occur on foreign soil.  Nevertheless, rules 
that purport to place limitations on holding companies and restrictions on 
gross investment amount are in theory difficult to apply to companies 
incorporated in foreign jurisdictions.  The Korea Fair Trade Commission 
presumably has no plans to apply such provisions to foreign funds.  
2. Regulation by Finance-Related Laws 
Under the Financial Holding Company Act (“FHCA”), non-financial 
institutions cannot in principle acquire voting shares amounting to more than 
four percent of the total outstanding shares of a bank holding company 
(Section 1 of Article 8-2).  Under the Banking Act, the same entities cannot 
acquire voting shares amounting to more than ten percent of the total 
outstanding shares of a bank without the approval of the Korean Financial 
Supervisory Commission (“KSFC”).  Furthermore, non-financial institutions 
cannot in principle acquire voting shares amounting to more than four 
percent of the total outstanding shares of a bank (Article 16-2). 
Such restrictions do not apply to foreign funds, however, because they 
can qualify as financial institutions by merely modifying their investment 
portfolios. 
3. Stringent Regulation of Private Indirect Investment Vehicles Under the 
IAMA   
Private indirect investment vehicles and securities investment 
company vehicles established to facilitate business takeovers (i.e., private 
equity M&A funds)31 were heavily regulated under the IAMA prior to the 
December 2004 amendment.  A substantial number of restrictions (e.g., 
restrictions on fund operations or exemption from public notice 
                                           
31
 Where an investment company’s indirect investment scheme involves incorporation for the 
purpose of associating another company as its affiliate company, the voting rights restriction under the 
IAMA does not apply.  See IAMA art. 142.  
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requirements)32 applicable to general indirect investment vehicles do not 
apply to private direct invest vehicles that satisfy the following criteria:33  (1) 
funds with fewer than 30 investors; (2) indirect investors that are either 
funds or institutional investors; (3) private individuals that are investing at 
least U.S. $10 million; or (4) non-individual legal entities corporations that 
are investing at least U.S. $50 million.  Accordingly, unless specifically 
exempted under Korean law, all such vehicles must adhere to regulations in 
the IAMA.  In particular, Section 2 of Article 89 of the IAMA prohibits 
investors from:  (1) borrowing money to fund their investments; (2) 
guaranteeing debt repayment; or (3) furnishing security. 
Under the December 2004 amendment, the IAMA introduced a new 
framework for the creation of a specialized private equity investment 
company (“SPEIC”), in an effort to promote domestic private equity funds 
that can eventually compete effectively with foreign private equity funds.  
Similar to U.S. private equity funds, a SPEIC is organized in the form of a 
limited partnership under the Korean Commercial Code (“KCC”), consisting 
of a general partner (the management firm which has unlimited liability) and 
limited partners (the investors who have limited liability).  Under certain 
scenarios, regulatory measures are eased with respect to:  (1) restrictions on 
acquisition of shares in banking and financial holding companies; (2) 
limitations on gross investment amount; and (3) restrictions regarding 
holding companies.  On its face, reverse discrimination against domestic 
companies in this matter has been remedied for the most part.  When 
compared to foreign funds, however, SPEICs are disappointing to some 
extent.  First, the legal structure of SPEICs is restricted to the form of a 
limited partnership under the KCC.  Second, investments made must be 
greater than ten percent of a targeted company’s total shares.  Third, no clear 
criteria have been provided in connection with permissible investments by 
pension funds, as had initially been proposed by the government 
amendment. 
                                           
32
 See IAMA art. 175.  
33
 Investment trusts and investment companies are generally prohibited from investing in investment 
securities in excess of 10/100 of the total value of assets of each indirect investment fund, or investing in 
excess of 10/100 of the total number of shares issued by the same company per the total value of assets of 
each indirect investment fund.  See IAMA art. 88, §§ 1-2.  This general provision, however, is inapplicable 
to private equity indirect investment schemes.  See IAMA art. 88, § 1; IAMA art. 175, § 1. 
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4. Restricting the Voting Rights of a Majority Shareholder in Appointing 
a Member of Audit Committee Who Is Neither an Auditor Nor an 
Outside Director 
This matter is dealt with separately in detail below.  
5. Issues Pertaining to Statement of Substantial Share Ownership (and 
Statement of Changes in Substantial Share Ownership) 
The issue of fairness has become a subject of debate surrounding the 
alleged discriminatory sanctions imposed for violations committed in 
connection with the statement of substantial share ownership requirements 
(i.e., the five-percent rule) on the part of foreign funds and financial 
companies.  When the violations occurred, domestic companies were 
criminally indicted by prosecutors, whereas their foreign counterparts were 
simply given notice or warnings.  According to official government reports 
submitted by the KSFC as of September 2004, violations committed by 
foreign funds and foreign financial companies numbered 77 in 2002, 122 in 
2003, and 61 in 2004.  The remedial measures taken by the KSFC were 
practically ineffective, amounting to a mere slap on the wrist.  For domestic 
companies and individual investors, on the other hand, there have been a 
total of 1,175 violations from 2002 through the first half of 2004.  About 
13.7% (161 cases) of the violations resulted in criminal indictments by 
prosecutors.  Additionally, at least seven court orders for liquidation of 
shares have been issued since 1997.34  Some believe this constitutes reverse 
discrimination against domestic companies and investors.  
In many cases, however, violations committed abroad by foreign 
funds and foreign financial companies resulted from their difficulties with 
producing and submitting the required documents in a short time frame.  In 
other words, their violations were merely technical in nature.  By contrast, 
most of the violations by their South Korean counterparts which led to an 
indictment or a share-liquidation order were cases involving intentional 
violations of relevant laws, including stock price manipulations.  Therefore, 
it is doubtful whether a simple comparison of the number of violations can 
provide any meaningful information.  Other matters regarding the statement 
of substantial share ownership requirements will be considered in the 
following section.   
                                           
34
 Foreigners’ 5% Rule Violations, KOREAN ECONOMICS NEWS, Oct. 11, 2004, at P1.  
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B. Issues Pertaining to the Statement of Substantial Share Ownership 
(and the Statement of Changes in Substantial Share Ownership)  
1. The General Problem  
The Korean Securities and Exchange Act (“KSEA”) contains an 
important provision which requires the filing of a statement of substantial 
share ownership (Article 200-2).35  When the number of shares held by 
majority shareholders changes, the KSEA requires this information to be 
disclosed to the public.  This provision is intended to heighten the 
transparency and fairness of the securities market and to expedite public 
announcement of hostile acquisitions of shares held by existing majority 
shareholders or management.  The public disclosure system is essential to 
advance investor protection.  It is important to disclose the identity of 
persons intending to acquire shares and the purpose of their acquisitions 
because the company stock price can be seriously affected by share 
acquisitions that lead to disputes over management rights.36  In addition, the 
public disclosure system is vital because of the possibility of unfair share 
purchase transactions. 
Foreign funds’ legal structure and investment schemes, however, 
differ from those of domestic funds.  In particular, foreign private equity 
funds are not typically required to furnish investment information to the 
public.  Moreover, even in substantial share acquisitions which cannot be 
regarded as portfolio investments, the contents of substantial share 
ownership statements are by themselves less than useful.  On the sole basis 
of such statements, one would have difficulties finding relevant information 
about the majority shareholders or the management.  Ordinary investors 
would also have a very hard time obtaining the identities of the actual 
beneficial owners of the funds, let alone information concerning their 
business organization and true investment purpose.37 
                                           
35
 Jae-Hyun Im, [Korean] Securities Regulation and Laws 635 (Park Young Sa ed., 2000).  
36
 Empirical research has shown that that when an investor’s purpose behind holding a large number 
of securities is publicly disclosed as simply “for investment,” the rate of return on his investment is far 
higher than when the announcement is made as “plans for acquisition of additional shares.”  See RONALD J. 
GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 935 (2d ed. 1995).  
37
 In reality, a question arises as to whether Sovereign properly or adequately stated its purpose for 
share acquisition in SK Corp., given that it had listed “creating profits” in its filed statement of substantial 
share ownership.  Based on Sovereign’s action thus far, there is a high possibility that the SK Corp. 
investment is not merely a portfolio investment, but an investment geared toward participation in SK 
Corp.’s management.  Some have alleged that Sovereign had this intention at the time of the statement 
filing.  Accordingly, a related issue arises as to whether this action constitutes a materially false statement. 
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Accordingly, prior to the recent amendment to the IAMA, an 
electronic notification system had been utilized for the substantial share 
ownership statements.  Investors were required to provide only a very brief 
statement of investment purpose with respect to their share ownership or 
changes in existing share ownership.  For example, investors had been 
permitted under the law to state only a few words, such as “management 
participation,” “investment to acquire management rights,” or “investment to 
manage securities products.”  No rules or provisions existed for submission 
of other information such as investment type, classification, or contents.  In 
effect, the older version of the IAMA contained no guidance with regard to 
the detailed disclosure of investment purpose. 
On the other hand, when several funds are combined for the purpose 
of acquiring a substantial amount of shares in a company, it is likely that the 
funds are not meaningfully related to one another.  Even if a relationship 
does exist, in many cases the funds are probably not familiar with each other 
and are likely unknown to the public.  Accordingly, if several funds are 
combined to purchase substantial shares in violation of the public disclosure 
requirement, stock price movements will likely be unpredictable from the 
perspective of both the company invested in and the market.  Especially in 
cases where large-scale asset management companies operate multiple 
funds, problems may potentially arise when fund managers are placed under 
undue pressure from outside influences because (1) communication and 
decisions are made entirely by fund managers and (2) no investment 
companies maintain perfectly functioning internal control systems with 
respect to the public disclosure of funds.  This sort of problem could become 
more serious when the asset management companies involved are 
incorporated overseas and operate dozens or hundreds of funds. 
2. Technical Problems Peculiar to Foreign Funds  
Where an asset management company (i.e., a fund manager) operates 
multiple funds, other concerned parties face the problem of determining who 
actually constitutes “specially related persons” and whether certain holdings 
of shares amount to “quasi-ownership” under the Presidential Decree of the 
KSEA.  They also face the problem of determining whether or not filings of 
substantial share ownership statements have been actually made by the fund 
manager or company.  This is true even when the parties have fully complied 
with the requirements set forth in the statement of substantial share 
ownership reports.  For this reason, the KSFC implemented a new disclosure 
system in March 2004.  The new disclosure system first considers whether 
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or not the asset management company in question actually holds shares.  It 
then determines whether or not the investment company and funds are 
“specially related,” and if so, it further classifies them as either “wholly 
related” or “partially related.”38  The new disclosure system is enormously 
complex, containing many ambiguous elements.  Substantial confusion is 
therefore likely to result for the time being.  
The IAMA requires that substantial share ownership statements be 
filed within five business days of the date of share acquisition.  It is 
practically impossible, however, for large-scale overseas asset management 
companies to meet this requirement because most of them invest through 
dozens of funds and must combine their investment activities.  In many 
cases, therefore, unintentional violations of the disclosure rule occur.  This 
can ultimately lead to internal compliance issues because such violations are 
deemed to constitute violations of securities laws in their home 
jurisdictions. 39   Hence where the purpose of investment is neither to 
participate in management nor to acquire management rights, it seems 
necessary to adopt measures providing exceptions to existing policy, 
permitting foreign investors to (1) submit a combined filing on or prior to 
the tenth day of the following month (as had been applicable to domestic 
institutional investors) or (2) submit an initial filing which is supplemented 
afterwards with additional materials.  
3. The Need for Adequate Disclosure  
For the reasons outlined above, it is necessary to implement additional 
requirements on investment funds in order to provide more information to 
the public.  Regardless of whether the funds are foreign or domestic, there is 
a high likelihood that the true identities of actual investors—masked under 
the fund names—will not be disclosed to the public in an adequate manner.  
There is no harm involved in demanding information from the actual 
investors so that their identities may be publicly released.  It is also not 
unreasonable to demand information from them about the funds they 
actually own as long as there is no undue burden on their part.  In the United 
States, for instance, funds must disclose in detail the nature of any 
                                           
38
 Korean Financial Supervisory Commission, System Proposals to Improve Public Disclosure of 
Share Ownership and Clarification of Reporting Methods Associated with Statement of Ownership of 
Shares of Foreign Mutual Funds (Mar.16, 2004).  
39
 Foreign investors generally submit substantial share ownership statements with the assistance of a 
domestic law firm.  When foreign investors fail to meet the submission deadline as a result of being 
unaware of the legal requirements or lack of adequate preparation, the Korean Financial Supervisory 
Commission issues a warning letter.  In some cases, several domestic law firms representing foreign 
investors have received multiple warning letters on behalf of their clients. 
FEBRUARY 2006 THE CURRENT STATE OF EQUITY INVESTMENTS 95 
shareholding relationship and information about their employees.  Further, 
Schedule 13-D, a form used in the filing of a statement of substantial share 
ownership to comply with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 
requires a furnisher to provide specific details such as information on each 
partner in a general partnership or a limited partnership.  There are 
additional requirements under Schedule 13-D.  It requires disclosure of 
information relating to the identities of persons or entities having control or 
authority of a partner.  In cases where the partner is a corporation, additional 
disclosure must be made with respect to any officer and any other entity 
which has control of the corporation.40 
To make public disclosure effective, information relating to 
“personnel and employees” of a fund should be furnished in detail as well as 
information relating to specific circumstances that give reasonable 
inferences of the funds’ investment purposes.  Accordingly, the KSFC has 
recently introduced additional requirements in connection with filing of the 
substantial share ownership statement.  When filing, a furnisher is required 
to choose between two initial categories:  either “ordinary investment,” or 
“investment to acquire management rights or to participate in management.”  
In the latter category, the furnisher is required to provide the following 
disclosures with specificity:  (1) current intent to either directly or indirectly 
engage in management; (2) plans to replace or change management; (3) 
future plans relating to direct participation in management (including plans 
to elect the furnisher or other specially-related parties41 as officers); (4) plans 
to amend provisions in the articles of incorporation relating to changes in the 
management structure, including the number of directors; (5) plans relating 
to any additional share acquisitions; and (6) plans to sell or liquidate 
shares.42   These new disclosure requirements set by the KSFC seem to 
mirror those requirements found in the U.S. disclosure system.  The revised 
disclosure system is regarded as being especially helpful in gathering 
adequate information on foreign funds’ investment objectives.43 
                                           
40
 For a detailed discussion, see Hwa-Jin Kim, Recent Trends and Legal Policies in the [Korean] 
M&A Market, BFL, Vol. 6, 43-44.  
41
 The phrase “specially-related party” or “specially-related person” can be generally defined as 
either a party that directly or indirectly owns 50% or more of the voting shares of the other party or a party 
that can de facto determine or control the other party's business policy. 
42
 Summary Briefing Report, Methods and Contents of Share Ownership Purpose and 
Announcement of 5% Public Disclosure Requirement, The Korean Financial Supervisory Commission, 
Oct. 5, 2004. 
43
 Other than the enumerated matters that are subject to disclosure, the United States’ Schedule 13-D 
Item 4 also requires the submission of information in connection with any plan for (1) an extraordinary 
corporate transaction, such as a merger, reorganization or liquidation, involving the issuer or any of its 
subsidiaries; (2) a sale or transfer of substantially all assets of the issuer or any of its subsidiaries; and (3) 
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C. Restricting the Voting Rights of a Majority Shareholder in Appointing 
a Member of an Audit Committee Who Is Neither an Auditor Nor an 
Outside Director  
When electing auditors, Section 2 of Article 409 of the KCC places a 
statutory limit on the amount of voting shares by providing that “any 
shareholder who holds more than three percent of the total outstanding 
shares, exclusive of non-voting shares, may not exercise his vote with 
respect to the shares in excess of the above limit.”  Under the KSEA, 
however, majority shareholders’ voting rights are limited to three percent in 
combination of specially-related persons’ voting rights.  (Section 11(1) of 
Article 191 of the KSEA and Section 18 of Article 84 of the Presidential 
Decree of the KSEA).   
At the 2004 general shareholder meeting of SK Corp., Sovereign split 
its main fund into several parts (establishing five separate subsidiaries 
holding 100% of total shares).  Each subsidiary was made to hold less than 
three percent of the total number of outstanding shares, which effectively 
meant that Sovereign fully exercised all of its voting share rights.  On the 
other hand, other controlling shareholders were deemed single individual 
shareholders and exercised no greater than three percent voting share rights.  
Although Sovereign indicated their reason for the split as “internal risk 
management” on their change of ownership statement, it is more likely that 
Sovereign’s actions were deliberately taken in view of the above statutory 
limitations on voting share rights.  
The KSEA provision is primarily intended to protect minority 
shareholders by making it difficult for a majority shareholder of listed 
companies to appoint non-outside directors who are auditors.  In reality, 
however, the provision helps to serve the interests of majority shareholders 
who can potentially acquire management rights.  In particular, it can give 
greater protection to foreign funds with enormous financial assets.  As 
illustrated by the Sovereign case, foreign investors in South Korea can freely 
establish multiple funds by dividing their owned shares into many parts.  By 
contrast, domestic shareholders’ voting shares (including the shares of any 
specially related persons) face the three-percent restrictions under the KSEA 
provision.  Moreover, the possibility of transferring or dispersing domestic  
 
 
                                                                                                                              
any material change in the present capitalization or dividend policy of an issuer where the issuer is a 
closed-end mutual fund. 
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shareholders’ shares to third parties is practically slim because of restrictions 
placed on gross investment amount and tax burdens on stock transfer profits.  
This illustrates one instance of reverse discrimination against Korean 
investors. 
Restricting the voting rights of shareholders in appointing a member 
of the audit committee is intended primarily to protect minority 
shareholders.  Hence within the context of the problem above, no significant 
differences should exist between a shareholder with the largest number of 
shares and a majority shareholder.  Accordingly, a majority shareholder who 
holds more than ten percent of the total outstanding shares must meet a 
separate public disclosure obligation under the KSEA.  Because of this 
additional requirement, it is more reasonable to apply the KSEA provision to 
majority shareholders as well—to restrict their voting rights in appointing a 
member of the audit committee who is not an outside director (taking into 
account the shares of any specially-related persons).  This would likely 
prevent a majority shareholder (having ten percent or more of shares) from 
exerting undue influence over the audit member-appointing process.  
Further, this would help strengthen the voting rights of true minority 
shareholders and can help eliminate the reverse discrimination resulting 
from some of the MRFTA restrictions levied against domestic companies or 
shareholders.  
D. Application of the Foreign Investment Promotion Act   
The Foreign Investment Promotion Act (“FIPA”) is intended mainly to 
promote foreign direct investment.  Various benefits are conferred upon 
those foreign investors whose investments constitute “foreign investment” 
within the meaning of the FIPA.  Under the MRFTA, where a company 
acquires or owns securities of a foreign-invested company under the FIPA, 
two things happen.  First, the company secures a five-year grace period in 
which no restrictions are placed on the company with respect to gross 
investments made from the date of such acquisition or ownership (Section 
1(3) of Article 10 of the MRFTA).  Furthermore, regulations dealing with 
securities acquisition and disposition under the Foreign Exchange 
Transactions Act (“FETA”) become applicable.  However, if a foreign 
investor in principal invests greater than U.S. $50,000 and acquires more 
than ten percent of the total outstanding shares in any invested company, the 
company is deemed to be a foreign investment company within the meaning 
of the FIPA.   
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The FIPA does not target short-term portfolio investments, but instead 
facilitates long-term investments to promote the development of invested 
companies in cooperation with majority shareholders and management.  
Although investments made by foreign private equity funds may qualify as 
“long-term investments” under the FIPA, they are in many cases mere 
portfolio investments.  Despite this, it is difficult to fathom how a foreign 
private equity fund can be considered a foreign direct investment and 
therefore obtain various benefits under the FIPA on the basis of only 
acquiring at least ten percent of the total outstanding shares of a Korean 
company (including acquisitions made in aggregate with other funds).   
Hence, when Sovereign acquired 14.99% of SK Corp. shares, SK 
Corp. became by default a foreign investment company within the meaning 
of the FIPA.  Under the MRFTA, the parent SK Group therefore violated the 
restrictions on gross investment amount and became subject to voting rights 
restrictions based on the number of shares held.  The violation exceeded the 
scope of the MRTFA by virtue of the exemption under FIPA, leading to a 
completely unexpected result.  The South Korean government has therefore 
proposed to amend the relevant provision of the MRFTA (Chapter 10, 
Article 1, Section 3).44  The proposed amendment would exempt foreign 
investments from the restrictions on gross investment amount and be 
applicable only if a foreign investor (or its subsidiaries) holds more than ten 
percent of the total outstanding shares of the invested companies.  This 
amendment alone, however, would not completely resolve the problem 
outlined above. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
This Article has given a brief and general introduction to foreign 
funds and reviewed several legal issues related to the current state of their 
equity investments in South Korea.  The Korean securities market is now a 
part of the global capital market.  Securities investments held by foreign 
investors amount to approximately 40 percent of the total aggregate value of 
listed securities in the Korean market and more than 50 percent of these 
foreign-owned securities are held by foreign funds.  Foreign securities 
investments in South Korea will probably not decline in the near future.  In 
this setting, one should not focus solely on negative aspects of foreign fund 
investments or conclude that management of Korean companies by 
foreigners is entirely bad.  In reality, foreign investment activities in South 
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 Translator’s Note:  This amendment was passed by the Korean National Assembly in December 
31, 2004, and became effective April 1, 2005.  
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Korea have had great positive impact on the economy.  In particular, they 
have made substantial contributions to improving corporate governance of 
Korean companies.  Therefore, this Article suggests that further efforts 
should be made by the South Korean government to devise and improve 
ways of attracting foreign investment, including foreign funds, to the Korean 
capital markets.  The current system demands further reform, since foreign 
investments still face unreasonable procedural hurdles like the short time 
limitation imposed on filing of the statement of substantial share ownership 
statement.  In addition, South Korea should encourage and promote long-
term direct investments by foreigners, rather than focusing only on portfolio 
investments.  South Korea should also conduct analyses of investment trends 
and techniques, taking into account different types of investors.      
Moreover, South Korea should implement additional legal measures 
to further alleviate the impact of reverse discrimination against its domestic 
companies and investors.  In this context, the recent amendment to the 
IAMA bodes well.  It is poised to create a vital framework through which 
domestic funds can compete effectively with their foreign counterparts.  
Similar to foreign funds, domestic private equity funds will assume a 
significant role in South Korea’s corporate governance system and the M&A 
market.   
Because this Article examined several legal issues from the author’s 
standpoint, it was unable to consider many other important aspects of this 
debate.  The author hopes further discussions will continue on such matters 
in the future. 
